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Abstract
There are two theoretically parallel ways in which principals can manipulate agents’ choices:
with monetary incentives (mechanism design) or Bayesian persuasion (information design). We
are interested in whether incentives or persuasion is a better strategy for principals. We con-
duct an experiment that investigates the behavioral side of the theoretical parallelism between
these approaches. We find that principals are more successful when persuading than when
incentivizing. Agents appear to be more demanding in mechanism design than in informa-
tion design. Our analysis also identifies many features that make mechanism and information
design behaviorally distinct in practice.
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1 Introduction
There are two strategies that a principal can employ to induce an agent to take a particular action.
One possibility is to use monetary incentives that impact the agent’s payoffs, the other is through
Bayesian persuasion, a strategy that affects the agent’s beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes
following her choice. For example, consider an online retailer (the principal) who attempts to
convince a consumer (the agent) to buy some product. The consumer faces uncertainty over the
quality of the product and prefers to buy if the quality is high and not to buy if the quality is low.
The consumer also holds a prior belief about the likelihood of the product being good and acts
to maximize his expected utility. What do online retailers usually do to increase the chances that
their potential consumers find it optimal to purchase? First, they can provide monetary incentives—
like discounts, promotions, or bundling—directed at reducing consumers’ costs. Second, they can
utilize informational persuasion, for example, personalized recommendations, expert reviews, or
product placement, in order to change the consumers’ beliefs about the quality of the product.
While in the past monetary incentives were the main form of motivating economic agents, today
the manipulation of information becomes the force to reckon with. The emergence of massive
information gatekeepers who own and use information to guide consumer behavior is shifting the
balance of power from incentives to informational persuasion.
The goal of our study is to conduct a comparative analysis, both theoretical and behavioral,
of the two strategies that principals can use to influence agents’ choices. We draw our inspiration
from the recent literature that attempts to study Bayesian persuasion in a general game-theoretic
framework (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011), making parallels with mechanism design and naming
it “Information Design.”1 The studies by Bergemann and Morris (2017) and Taneva (2017) examine
the problem of a designer who seeks to impose an agenda on a group of players. They consider
three ingredients of a game: (1) the basic game structure (the sequence of moves, action spaces);
(2) the payoff structure and (3) the information that agents possess regarding payoff-relevant states
and other players’ types. The game structure (1) is assumed given. An information/mechanism
designer takes (2)/(3) as given and optimizes the design of (3)/(2). While, as is conventional in
mechanism design, the designer is assumed to have the ability to commit to a transfer mapping to
the players, the information designer is instead assumed to have an informational advantage over
the players by being able to commit to a signal structure (probabilistic state-message mapping),
essentially recommending actions to players.2
1The literature on information design is expanding fast with many recent contributions (Alonso and Caˆmara,
2016a,b,c; Babichenko and Barman, 2016; Bergemann and Morris, 2016; Bizzotto et al., 2016; Boleslavsky and Kim,
2018; DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010; Dughmi and Xu, 2016; Dughmi et al., 2016; Dughmi and Xu, 2017; Gentzkow
and Kamenica, 2014, 2016, 2017; Gratton et al., 2017; Herna´ndez and Neeman, 2018; Kolotilin et al., 2017; Li and
Norman, 2017; Wang, 2013). The early seminal papers include Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Okuno-Fujiwara et al.
(1990).
2For another interesting approach see Mathevet et al. (2017).
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This theoretical parallelism is both intriguing and exciting for game theorists and economists
in general. The mechanism design problems explored in many original studies of the past decades
can now be investigated through an alternative route, namely information design. From an applied
perspective, this raises several natural questions. How does this theoretical parallelism play out in
practice? Can information designers use persuasion with the same effect as mechanism designers
use incentives? How do agents react to being persuaded rather than incentivized? These questions
define the scope of our paper. In a simple bilateral setting, where principals can act as both
information and mechanism designers, we investigate whether they are more successful in using
incentives or persuasion to influence agent’s choice and to increase their payoffs.
In the theoretical part of the paper we use the standard two-state Bayesian persuasion model
(Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). We start with a baseline setup in which a principal is not able
to act as information or mechanism designer and trivially show that, in this case, she is guaranteed
zero payoff. Then we extend the baseline game in two directions: 1) the principal can act as an
information designer in an attempt to persuade the agent to take the principal-preferred action
and 2) the principal can act as a mechanism designer in an attempt to incentivize the agent to
take the principal-preferred action. Using the Kamenica and Gentzkow’s “Principal-Preferred”
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium we show that the two games are equivalent in terms of best response
correspondences and that the expected payoffs of both the principal and the agent are identical in
equilibrium.3
With this theoretical equivalence in place, we have a foundation on which we can test our
research questions. Experimentally, however, we face two problems: 1) information design in its
standard form is too computationally intensive for lab participants and 2) information design and
mechanism design are very different tasks, thus in order to detect behavioral differences that arise
exclusively from their inherent features, the experimental setup should maximize the similarity
of the two choice environments and eliminate any other confounds. To solve these problems we
propose an innovative experimental design, which not only minimizes the differences between the
two games, but also renders Bayesian persuasion a (relatively) user-friendly task. Apart from
allowing us to tackle the research questions stated above, our experiment is the first attempt to
experimentally investigate the theoretical parallelism between information and mechanism design
that also overcomes many of the challenges in bringing the theoretical setup of Bayesian persuasion
to the lab (Fre´chette et al., 2018; Nguyen, 2016; Au and Li, 2018).
We find that principals are able to use persuasion (information design) to a much better extent
than incentives (mechanism design) in order to manipulate agents to choose their preferred action.
Principals are able to persuade agents more often than they are able to incentivize them, and
successful persuasions are, on average, more profitable than successful incentivizations. This result
3Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) name it “Sender-Preferred” Subgame Perfect Equilibrium to emphasize that in
all of the cases where the receiver is indifferent between actions she always chooses the one that the sender prefers.
We do the same except that, for reasons pertaining to comparison with the mechanism design literature, we call the
Sender Principal and the Receiver Agent.
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seems to be driven by the fact that agents are more demanding when they are being incentivized than
when they are being persuaded, which hinges critically on agents’ perception of the relative value of
information and money. However, principals’ payoffs in both games still fall short of the theoretical
predictions of the Principal-Preferred Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, which according to our analysis
ignores a very important aspect of the principal-agent interaction: the distribution of bargaining
power. While the two-stage nature of the non-cooperative game attributes zero bargaining power
to the agents, we find that they are able to seize some part of the surplus, as if they have 40% of
the bargaining power, a result that holds in both information and mechanism design tasks.
Participants’ behavior in the information design task is close to the equilibrium in terms of
average choices. Nevertheless, we find that heterogeneous and erratic individual decisions cause
large inefficiencies and have detrimental effect on the principals’ payoffs. Exploring the inherent
differences between information and mechanism design, we find that the smoother payoffs that
mechanism design admits (transfers between players mitigate extreme payoffs) make players more
stable in their choices. Conversely, the extreme nature of payoffs in information design causes strong
reactions that lead to inefficiencies.
We also find that the nature of the “contract” between agents and principals is perceived dif-
ferently in information and mechanism design. When agents are successfully persuaded but end
up with a bad outcome they exhibit an extreme reaction, reminiscent of betrayal aversion. In
mechanism design such reaction does not arise since agents are directly compensated for exactly
that contingency. Thus, belief manipulation can have behavioral side effects that are avoided with
incentivization.
Our data suggest that participants have much more difficulties dealing with probabilistic reason-
ing in information design than with monetary transfers in mechanism design. Specifically, agents’
choices are far from what they themselves believe is optimal to do in information design, but are
very close to their beliefs in mechanism design.
Overall, our experiment shows that behavioral differences in participants’ perception of informa-
tional and monetary incentives make the theoretical parallelism between mechanism and information
design harder to motivate in practice. Thus, real-world designers should consider which strategy is
most effective in each specific situation. While in our setting principals are better off persuading
than incentivizing agents, it is likely that other environments will produce different results.
2 Theoretical Framework
The results derived from the theoretical framework presented in this section serve as the motivation
behind our research questions and the experimental design. The framework is a version of the
original two-state Bayesian persuasion setup from Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). We begin with
an adaptation of the model where the principal (sender) is stripped of his ability to send messages
to the agent (receiver), thus making him a mere observer. This results in the expected utility
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maximizing agent (receiver) choosing the action that gives the principal the smallest payoff. We
then extend this baseline setup in two independent directions. In the first extension, the principal
can commit to probabilistic state-contingent messages to the agent (persuasion) in the same way as
in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). We call this the “information design extension.” In the second
extension, the principal can instead commit to action-contingent transfers to the agent (incentives).
We call this the “mechanism design extension.” Finally, the agent observes the principal’s message
or incentives and takes an action. Both games admit a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in
which the expected payoffs of principals/agents are identical in the two games. More precisely,
while the principal benefits from having the ability to commit to messages (persuasion) or transfers
(incentives), she is indifferent between the two. The agent neither gains nor loses from the principal’s
ability to persuade or incentivize.
2.1 The Baseline Model
Suppose that there are two players Principal (P ) and Agent (A), and two states of the world
S = {R,B} (red or blue ball) happening with probabilities Pr(B) > Pr(R) ≡ p, which is common
knowledge. The agent’s action set is CA = {r, b}, and the Principal’s action set is empty, CP = {∅}.
The state-action contingent payoffs for each player are denoted by Πis,c ∈ R, where i ∈ {A,P} refers
to the player, s ∈ S refers to the realized state and c ∈ CA refers to the agent’s action. The agent
receives positive payoff if she chooses the action which matches the state (i.e., c = r when s = R
or c = b when s = B). The principal’s payoffs are state-independent. She is solely interested in
the agent’s action and receives positive payoff only when the agent takes action r. We assume
that the payoffs adhere to the following restrictions: ΠAR,r = Π
A
B,b ≡ ΠA > 0, ΠAR,b = ΠAB,r = 0,
ΠPR,r = Π
P
B,r ≡ ΠP > 0, ΠPR,b = ΠPB,b = 0. To achieve the equality of the expected payoffs
in equilibrium in the information design and mechanism design extensions, we need to impose
ΠA = ΠP ≡ Π. The payoffs are summarized in Table 1.
State realization
R B
Agent’s choice
r Π , Π Π , 0
b 0 , 0 0 , Π
Table 1: Payoff matrix in the baseline model. In each cell, the leftmost number represents the
principal’s payoff.
The agent maximizes her expected payoff and thus will always choose b, which maximizes the
(ex-ante) probability of matching the state. Given the agent’s optimal action c∗ = b, the expected
utilities of the players are
EsΠ
P
s,c∗ = 0 (Principal
Baseline)
EsΠ
A
s,c∗ = (1− p)Π. (AgentBaseline)
4
2.2 Information Design Extension
Consider the following extension of the baseline model where the principal can act as an information
designer (Stage 1) prior to the agent’s choice (Stage 2). The principal is now endowed with the abil-
ity to construct a state-message mapping (henceforth, a “signal structure”) from which a message
m—correlated with the realized state of the world—is communicated to the agent. This mapping
determines the level of correlation between the states of the world and the messages (or the infor-
mativeness of each message). The principal’s action set becomes CP = {(PR, PB) | PR, PB ∈ [0, 1]},
where PR = Pr(m = ρ|s = R), PB = Pr(m = β|s = B)} are the probabilities of a message
m ∈M = {ρ, β} that is to be communicated to the agent (ρ and β are principal’s recommendations
about the color of the ball, red or blue).4 Knowing (PR, PB) and m, the agent Bayes-updates her
beliefs about the likelihood of each state based on the message received and the signal structure from
which the message was generated. Given her updated beliefs, the agent maximizes her expected
payoff by choosing action c∗, which matches the state that is more likely to have been realized. Im-
plicit in this are two critical assumptions: 1) the principal is able to condition the messages on the
realized state of the world without having observed it and 2) the principal can credibly commit to
the signal structure (i.e., the agent can observe the mapping which generated the message). With-
out loss of generality, we assume |M | = |S| (see Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). Thus, messages
can be thought of as action recommendations. The unique Principal-Preferred Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium [(PP)SPE] of this game admits the following expected payoffs:5
EsΠ
P
s,c∗ = 2pΠ (Principal
ID)
EsΠ
A
s,c∗ = (1− p)Π (AgentID)
Note the following: 1) the principal uses Bayesian persuasion (information design) to increase her
expected payoff from zero (baseline model) to 2pΠ, by providing state-contingent messages (action
recommendations) that the agent finds optimal to follow rather than ignore; 2) the agent neither
benefits nor loses from the principal’s persuasion. The latter happens because, while the principal
tries to extract as much surplus as possible, she is constrained by the expected payoff that the agent
can guarantee herself by simply choosing b, which we will refer to as the agent’s outside option.
Thus, all social surplus generated by information design is captured by the principal.
2.3 Mechanism Design Extension
Consider another extension of the baseline model, where the principal can act as a mechanism
designer (Stage 1) prior to the agent’s decision (Stage 2). The principal is now able to construct an
action-contingent mapping which determines how payoffs are to be transferred from the principal
4A message ρ or β is always sent. When the ball is red, the message β is sent with probability 1− PR and when
the ball is blue the message ρ is sent with probability 1− PB .
5See Appendix A.1 for derivations.
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to the agent conditional on the agent’s action. As a mechanism designer, the principal’s action set
becomes CP = {(tr, tb) | tr, tb ∈ [0,Π]}, where tr and tb are the transfers to the agent if she chooses
action r or b respectively. The agent takes into account the additional conditional payoffs and
chooses action c∗ that maximizes her overall expected payoff.6 Implicit in this are two assumptions:
1) the principal is able to condition the transfers on the agent’s actions; 2) the principal can credibly
commit to the action-contingent transfers (i.e., the agent is guaranteed to receive the transfer that
is contingent on her chosen action). The unique Principal-Preferred Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
of this game admits the following expected payoffs:7
EsΠ
P
s,c∗ = 2pΠ (Principal
MD)
EsΠ
A
s,c∗ = (1− p)Π (AgentMD)
Note the following: 1) the principal uses monetary incentives (mechanism design) to increase her
expected payoff from 0 (baseline model) to 2pΠ, by providing action-contingent transfers which
induce the agent to choose action r instead of her baseline-optimal action b; 2) the agent neither
benefits nor loses from the principal’s incentivization. The agent’s expected payoff remains the
same as in the baseline game, and thus all social surplus from mechanism design is captured by the
principal.
We summarize the equilibrium expected payoffs from the baseline model and the two extensions:
PrincipalBaseline < PrincipalID = PrincipalMD
AgentBaseline = AgentID = AgentMD
The equality of the principal’s equilibrium expected payoffs in the information design and the
mechanism design extensions of the baseline model is our theoretical object of interest that the
experiment described below is designed to test.
3 Experiment
The experiment consisted of two treatments with three sections in each: Section ID (information
design), Section MD (mechanism design), and Section 3. The two treatments differed in the order
of sections ID and MD, while Section 3 was always implemented the last. This allowed us to
investigate possible order effects in the ID and MD sections. At the beginning of the experiment
participants were randomly assigned one of two possible roles: Principal (denoted as “Player A”) or
Agent (denoted as “Player B”), the roles that were fixed throughout the experiment. In Section ID
participants played 10 periods of the information design game, and in Section MD they played 10
6Here “additional” refers to the conditional payoffs that the agent receives in addition to the payoffs described in
Table 1.
7See Appendix A.2 for derivations.
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periods of the mechanism design game. In each period, every principal was randomly matched with
one agent to form a pair and to play the respective game. At the end of each period each participant
received feedback about the outcome of the game and points earned.8 Section 3 consisted of several
tasks designed to help us to measure the behavioral traits potentially responsible for behavioral
differences in the ID and MD games. Participants were paid for one randomly chosen period from
each section with an exchange rate of 100 points corresponding to 5 Euros (thus, they were paid
for three choices in total).
In each period and for every pair, participants were told that a ball would be randomly drawn
from a virtual urn with 10 balls, three of which were red and seven blue. The goal of the agent was
to correctly guess the color of the ball, and the goal of the principal was to attempt to persuade
(section ID) or incentivize (section MD) the agent to guess red. The color of the ball was revealed to
the participants at the end of the period. Experimental points earned by each participant depended
on the revealed color and the agent’s guess in accordance with the games in our models with p = 0.3
and Π = 100.
While the ID and MD games in our theoretical framework are described as two-stage sequential
games, we implemented both as simultaneous-move games by eliciting agent’s choices with the
strategy method. The principal constructed a signal structure (ID) or transfers (MD) and, at the
same point in time, the agent chose which signal structures she wished to follow (ID) or which
transfers to accept (MD). We describe this in more detail below.
3.1 Section ID (Information Design)
Principal’s choice. The principal’s role in ID was to act as an information designer in accor-
dance with the ID game described in Section 2.2. Specifically, the principal had to construct a
signal structure (PR, PB) that would generate the recommendation “Guess red” or “Guess blue”
conditional on the color of the ball drawn.9 To simplify the decision problem and following the
findings of Fre´chette et al. (2018), we fixed PR at the equilibrium level of PR = 1 (see Appendix
A.1).10 Consequently, the principal’s only choice was to set the percentage chance of generating the
correct recommendation when the ball drawn was blue. We denote this choice by X ∈ [0%, 100%].
Thus, the principal’s signal structure is (PR, PB) = (1, X). To understand what different choices
of X imply it is worth considering two extreme cases. When X = 100% the recommendation is
always correct and fully reveals the color of the ball. When X = 0% the recommendation is always
8Feedback for principals and agents was not the same and was structured to reflect the information that each
player would receive in an extensive form game. See Section 3.3 for details.
9The signal structure (PR, PB) sets the probabilities with which each recommendation is generated in each state
(ball color) as follows: PR = Pr(m = “Guess red” | s = Red ball) and PB = Pr(m = “Guess blue” | s = Blue ball).
10Fre´chette et al. (2018) allow subjects to manipulate the equivalent of PR and find that the vast majority of
choices are at equilibrium (PR = 1). We, thus, believe that our simplification does not significantly impact the
behavior.
7
“Guess red,” so no information about the color of the ball is provided since when the ball is red the
recommendation is also “Guess red” (PR = 1).
Agent’s choice. The agent’s role in ID was to determine whether she would follow or ignore the
principal’s recommendation for all possible signal structures. Following recommendation means
that the agent guesses the color that the recommendation suggests. Ignoring the recommendation
means that the agent guesses blue, which maximizes her payoff given the prior beliefs about the urn
composition. Without observing the principal’s choice of X, the agent had to select which signal
structures she wished to follow and which ones to ignore by choosing a cutoff minimum value of
PB denoted by Y ∈ [0%, 100%]. The elicitation of a cutoff is appropriate here because the infor-
mativeness of the signal structure is monotonic in X. As a result, the agent’s expected payoff from
following a recommendation from (1, X) is greater than that from following the recommendation
from any (1, X ′) with X ′ > X. By choosing Y in this manner the agent agreed ex ante to follow
the recommendation coming from a signal structure that is at least as informative as (1, Y ) and
to ignore the recommendation coming from less informative signal structures. Thus, the agent was
not explicitly asked for a guess. Instead, if the agent followed the principal’s signal (when X ≥ Y ),
her guess of the color of the ball was determined by the generated recommendation (red or blue),
while in the opposite case (X < Y ), her guess was always the color blue. Agents who choose high
values of Y are hard to persuade since they follow only very informative signals, while agents who
choose low Y are easy to persuade and follow recommendations for large range of X.
The ID interaction. The principal faces the following tradeoff. Decreasing X yields a higher
chance of the “Guess red” recommendation, but a lower chance that it will be followed by the agent
(X ≥ Y ). Thus the principal wants to choose X as low as possible conditional on it being weakly
greater than Y . The agent is less interested in the principal’s choice. As long as she doesn’t choose
Y too low, she is guaranteed a good expected payoff, either by being persuaded or through her
outside option (guess blue).
3.2 Section MD (Mechanism Design)
Principal’s choice. The principal’s role in MD was to act as a mechanism designer in accordance
with the MD game described in Section 2.3. The principal had to choose action-contingent transfers
(tr, tb) that would be transferred to the agent depending on her guess. In order to make the ID and
MD games similar and since the principal earned zero points when the agent’s guess was blue, we
fixed tb at the equilibrium level of tb = 0. Consequently, the principal’s only choice was to determine
the number of points that would be transferred to the agent if the agent’s guess was red (tr). We
also denote this choice by X ∈ [0, 100]. Thus, the principal was choosing (tr, tb) = (X, 0).
Agent’s choice. The agent’s role in MD was to determine whether she would accept or reject
the principal’s transfer. If the transfer is accepted, the agent committed to guessing red, while if
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it is rejected the agents committed to guessing blue. The agent had to choose which transfers she
wished to accept and which ones to reject by choosing a cutoff minimum value of tr, once again
denoted by Y ∈ [0, 100]. Eliciting a cutoff value is also appropriate here since the agent’s expected
payoff from accepting the transfer is monotonic in X. By choosing Y in this manner, the agent
agreed ex ante to accept the transfer (and guess red) if it was at least Y points and reject it (and
guess blue) if the transfer was less than Y points. Thus, like in ID, the agent was not explicitly
asked for a guess. If the agent accepted the principal’s transfer (when X ≥ Y ) her guess was red,
whereas if the agent rejected the transfer (when X < Y ) her guess was blue.
The MD interaction. The principal faces the following tradeoff. Decreasing X yields a higher
payoff if the agent accepts, but also a lower chance of acceptance (X ≥ Y ). Thus, once again, the
principal should aim to choose X as low as possible conditional on it being weakly greater than Y .
The agent is again less interested in the principal’s choice. As long as she doesn’t choose Y too
low, she is guaranteed a good expected payoff, either by being incentivized or through her outside
option (guess blue).
3.3 Feedback
At the end of every period, participants received feedback about the outcome of the game. Feed-
back was designed to reflect the information that participants would have received after playing the
two-stage ID or MD game. Both participants learned the color of the ball drawn, the recommen-
dation generated (only in ID), the agent’s guess and the points earned. Agents also learned the
principal’s choice of X (the signal structure or transfer) while principals only learned whether agents
followed/accepted (i.e., whether X ≥ Y ) or ignored/rejected their recommendation/transfer (i.e.,
whether X < Y ). The reason for this asymmetry in feedback is that neither theory nor practice
dictate that the principal should learn the precise amount of information or transfer that would
induce the agent to follow the recommendation or accept the transfer.
3.4 Summary of the Experimental Procedure
In each period (of sections ID and MD) a principal and an agent were randomly paired. Each
participant simultaneously chose a number from 0 to 100 by sliding a pointer (see Appendix G for
the screenshots). Principals’ choices were referred to as X and agents’ choices as Y . If X ≥ Y we
say that the principal has successfully persuaded/incentivized the agent (or that the players have
matched). In this case, the agent follows/accepts the principal’s recommendation/transfer. This in
turn implies that the agent’s guess is determined as follows. In Section ID the agent guesses red if the
recommendation is “Guess red” and guesses blue if the recommendation is “Guess blue.” In Section
MD if X ≥ Y the agent guesses red and X points are transferred from the principal to the agent.
If X < Y we say that the principal has failed to persuade/incentivize the agent (or that the players
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have not matched). In this case, the agent ignores/rejects the principal’s recommendation/transfer.
This implies that the agent guesses blue in both games and that no points are transferred in MD.
3.5 Section 3
Section 3 was always implemented the last (after sections ID and MD), and its purpose was to help
us to uncover the behavioral traits responsible for the observed differences in behavior between ID
and MD. It consisted of 4 choices in the order described below. All tasks were incentivized and one
was chosen randomly for payment.
Dictator ID Participants were randomly matched in pairs to play one round of ID. Each player
could fully control the outcome, which we call a Dictator choice. That is, principals chose X
under the condition that Y = 0, and agents chose Y under the condition that X = Y for any
chosen Y . Thus, all pairs were forced to match with the most favorable conditions for the
players who were choosing. This task served to control for differences in fairness considerations
in the two games and was incentivized in the same way as all the choices in the ID games.
Dictator MD Same as above only with MD.
Cutoff ID Participants were incentivized to give their best estimate of the Bayesian rational cutoff
in the ID game (the ID two-stage equilibrium outcome, 57.1 points). Specifically, they were
paid proportionally to how close their answer was to the actual cutoff. This served to control
for participants’ beliefs about the rational play in the ID game.
Cutoff MD Same as above only with MD (the MD two-stage equilibrium outcome with risk neutral
agent, 40 points).11
3.6 Design Implementation
The experiment was conducted in June 2018 at the Department of Economics, University of Trento,
Italy. We collected the data from 8 sessions with a total of 108 subjects. In the 4 sessions of
Treatment 1, participants played the ID section first, and in the 4 sessions of Treatment 2 they
played the MD section first. Each session with 12 or more participants was divided into two groups
in which random matching was done independently. Thus, the two groups inside such session never
interacted creating two independent observations. We have 6 groups with the total of 50 participants
in Treatment 1 and 7 groups with 68 participants in Treatment 2, which constitutes 13 independent
observations.
11To control for the possible effects of risk preferences we also elicited the MD cutoff unconstrained by risk
neutrality. Since we did not find statistically significant differences between the two measures, in our analysis we use
only the risk neutral one since our theory is based on risk neutral players.
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Participants were informed that they will take part in an experiment with three parts and that
the instructions for each part will be given to them before each part begins. In order to familiarize
the participants with the rules of the game and the interface, in Sections ID and MD they played
one round of the game in both roles (with themselves). We did not find any significant order effects
and thus we merge the data from the two treatments (irrespective of the order of sections ID and
MD). Sessions lasted around 1 hour and 30 minutes and participants were paid on average 12 Euros
(8 Euros for principals and 14 Euros for agents), a compensation which is in line with the average
payment for similar experiments in Italy.
4 Results
4.1 Incentives or Persuasion?
We start our analysis by looking at the average choices X and Y and comparing them to the
theoretical predictions. In order to be able to use the non-parametric tests we consider averages
over choices in each of the 13 independent groups of participants described in Section 3.6. Thus, we
operate with 13 independent observations. Table 2 shows average choices in all interactions (pairs)
and the corresponding theoretical counterparts partitioned by roles and type of games. In the ID
game principals’ and agents’ average choices are very close to the theoretical predictions (signed-
rank tests, p = 0.753 and p = .311 respectively), but are significantly higher than the predictions
in the MD game (signed-rank tests, p < 0.002). This means that agents are, on average, more
resistant to incentives than to the equivalent persuasion. In order to comply with the principal they
ask for more points in MD than for the equivalent signal informativeness in ID. This can make it
harder for principals to manipulate agents’ choices through monetary incentives, thus potentially
making persuasion a more successful strategy.
Section Measure Sample Principals Agents
Data Theory Data Theory
ID Choices All pairs 56.6 57.1 60.4 57.1
(3.01) (3.41)
MD Choices All pairs 50.2 40 56.5 40
(1.52) (3.43)
N of independent observations 13 13
Table 2: Average choices in the ID and MD games in 13 independent groups of participants. Num-
bers in brackets indicate standard errors. “Theory” columns show the theoretical point predictions
based on the (PP)SPE. “Data” columns show the averages over the 13 groups.
To understand whether principals are more successful at persuasion or incentivization notice
that their earnings critically depend on two factors: 1) how often a principal is able to successfully
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persuade/incentivize the agents (an unsuccessful attempt gives her zero points); 2) her choices in
the periods when she successfully persuades/incentivizes the agents. We find that in ID principals
are successful at persuasion on average in 5.25 periods out of 10, while in MD the success rate is
4.36 periods. The difference is significant (signed-rank test, p = .043). Thus, principals are more
often successful when persuading rather than when incentivizing agents. However, we still only
observe pairs matching about half of the time.12
Next, we look at the payoffs that principals and agents receive given a successful match. To
do that we consider average Matched Expected Payoffs (MEP). These are not the actual payoffs
observed by the participants, but rather what they should expect to receive given their choices
X and Y and conditional on being matched.13 We find that this is a better measure of players’
aggregate performance than the realized payoffs since MEP do not contain noise due to the random
draws of the ball and thus constitute a more natural comparison to the theoretical predictions.
Section Measure Sample Principals Agents
Data Theory Data Theory
ID Payoffs Matched pairs 47.8 60 82.2 70
(2.73) (2.73)
MD Payoffs Matched pairs 36.6 60 93.4 70
(3.41) (3.41)
N of independent observations 13 13
Table 3: Average Matched Expected Payoffs (MEP) in ID and MD. Numbers in brackets indicate
standard errors.
Table 3 shows average MEP in the 13 independent groups of participants. Successful persuasions
yield higher payoffs to the principals than successful incentivizations (signed-rank test, p = .0058).
MEP are higher in ID than in MD in 11 out of 13 groups. Nevertheless, principals still earn
significantly less than the equilibrium prediction (signed-rank tests, ID: p = .0037, MD: p = 0.0015).
These observation is also reflected in the earnings of the agents, who get significantly more than
the theoretical predictions (signed-rank tests, ID: p = .0037, MD: p = 0.0015).
Result 1. Principals make more money by persuading (ID) than by incentivizing (MD): 1) they
successfully persuade agents to follow recommendations more often than they manage to incentivize
them to accept transfers and 2) successful persuasion yields more payoff for the principals than
successful incentivization. This can be partially attributed to agents’ demanding higher monetary
transfers in MD than the equivalent informativeness of the recommendation in ID.
12As explained in Section 3.4, a match refers to the situation when X ≥ Y (a successful persuasion or incentiviza-
tion). The case X < Y is referred to as a non-match (an unsuccessful persuasion or incentivization).
13In case of a match in ID, Matched Expected Payoffs are (100 − 0.7X, 30 + 0.7X) for principals and agents
respectively. In case of a match in MD, Matched Expected Payoffs are (100−X, 30 +X).
12
4.2 Evolution of Choices in Time
In order to understand what drives the aggregate results in the previous section we examine the
per-period evolution of average choices in 13 independent groups shown in Figure 1. Two features
are immediately noticeable. First, the average play is around the equilibrium in all 10 periods in
ID, while generally higher than equilibrium in MD. Second, while choices in ID remain relatively
stable for both principals and agents, in MD we observe principals starting at the equilibrium level
in period 1, then gradually increasing their choices until they reach agents’ average choices, which
remain relatively stable throughout the game.
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Figure 1: Average choices of principals (dotted lines) and agents (dashed lines) in each period of
the ID and MD games. The solid red lines indicate the predictions of the two-stage (PP)SPE. Error
bars are ±1SE corresponding to 13 observations.
This behavior may indicate the existence of an inherent stable level of agents’ choices (different
in each game) towards which principals converge. In ID, by chance or not, principals seem to
achieve that point in period 1 and thus do not move away from it. An interpretation is that
participants understand the asymmetry in each player’s outside option. When not matched, agents
earn 70 points on average, whereas principals are guaranteed zero points. Thus, agents remain
relatively stable in their choices, while principals are forced to adapt to agents’ choices in order
to increase their chance of matching. This idea is illustrated by the dynamics of the number of
matches displayed on Figure 2. The number of matches in ID is stable, but in MD it grows together
with principals’ average choices reaching the levels of ID matches around period 8. Notice that the
overall percentage of matches is around 50% even in the late periods, which is extremely low.
Result 2. Both games exhibit large inefficiencies in terms of the social surplus lost due to unsuc-
cessful matches: about half of the pairs fail to match. While overall the situation is worse in MD,
the difference decreases over time and in the last two periods the number of unsuccessful attempts
is the same in the two games.
Next, we look at the evolution of choices for pairs that match as shown in Figure 3. We observe
large gaps between the average choices of principals and agents in both games that appear to
be stable over time (about 25% in ID and 20 points in MD). Thus, principals are giving away a
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Figure 2: Percentage of matched pairs (X ≥ Y ) per period in each game.
much larger share of the surplus than what their paired agents are willing to accept, surplus they
could have captured by lowering X.14 We hypothesize that the main reason behind the size and the
stability of the gaps is the heterogeneity in agents’ choices coupled with the principals’ sensitivity to
unsuccessful persuasions/incentivizations (in which case they end up with zero points). In support
of this idea remember that around half of the pairs do not match, which suggests that there is a
tangible threat for principals who choose a low X. Moreover, the histograms of the agents’ choices
in Figure 11 in Appendix D show significant levels of very high choices by agents (more in ID than
in MD). We explore these issues in more detail in Section 4.4 below.
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Figure 3: Average choices of matched pairs for each period of the ID and the MD games. The solid
red lines indicate the predictions of the two-stage (PP)SPE. Error bars are ±1SE corresponding to
13 observations.
Result 3. In an attempt to best respond to the heterogeneity in agents’ behavior, principals increase
their choices and give up a larger portion of the surplus than necessary. This is similar in both
games.
4.3 Nash Bargaining Solution
In Section 4.1 we saw that principals earn significantly less than the theoretical predictions in
both ID and MD, even conditional on successful matching, and that principals seem to adjust
14The average gap of 25% in ID translates to about 18 points.
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to the choices of the agents since they have much more to lose from a failure of persuasion or
incentivization. Such behavior is not consistent with the (PP)SPE and especially with the fact
that principals have the first mover advantage (agents’ choices are still the reactions to their move
even when chosen with the strategy method). However, our observations do suggest that what is
important behaviorally is the relative “bargaining power” of the principals and the agents. Thus,
in this section we analyze the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) of the two games, which—unlike
the non-cooperative equilibrium concepts—takes into account the outside options of the players.
To proceed with this analysis, notice that, conditional on a pair matching (X ≥ Y ), the share
of the total expected surplus (130 points) that each player receives is uniquely determined by X,
the principal’s choice (see footnote 13). Therefore, it is in the principal’s best interest to choose X
as low as possible, while it is in the agent’s best interest to try to force the principal to choose a
high X. Even though it is the principal’s choice that determines the share of expected surplus for
the two players, the agent can effectively threaten the principal with the possibility of a non-match
by increasing Y , implicitly forcing the principal’s choice upwards. Thus, while theoretically the
first-mover advantage gives the principal full bargaining power, in practice the asymmetry in each
player’s outside option may change that.
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Figure 4: Best response correspondences and Nash Equilibria in the ID and MD games.
The questions now are What theoretical outcome should this bargaining process yield given the
parameters of the ID and MD games? and Can the behavior of the participants be explained by
some Nash Bargaining Solution? To find the answers we first look at the normal forms of the two
games. The strategy sets of the two players are X ∈ [0, 100] and Y ∈ [0, 100]. Figure 4 shows
the best response correspondences and the sets of Nash equilibria in the ID and MD games (see
Appendix A.3 for details). One can easily see that the best responses in the games are the same
except for the point of the switch in the agent’s best response correspondence. There is a continuum
of NE that range from the agent-preferred to the principal-preferred, which is also the (PP)SPE
of the extensive form game. Thus, the games are the same in terms of their “non-cooperative”
structure.
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Figure 5 shows the possible outcomes of the games in the expected payoffs space (any choice
of X and Y maps into some pair of expected payoffs). The black lines represent the possible
expected payoffs in case there is a match (X ≥ Y ), and the “Non-match” points show the payoffs
in case X < Y . Notice, however, that the disagreement outcomes are not necessarily the same as
a non-match. We calculate them as the minimal expected payoffs that each player can guarantee
regardless of the choices of the other. In the ID game the principal can guarantee herself 30 points
by choosing X = 100, which the agent is forced to accept by the design of the game. In the MD
game the principal can only guarantee herself 0 points by choosing X = 100. The agent can always
get the minimum of 70 points by choosing Y = 100 in either game.15 From the graphs it is clear
that, given these disagreement outcomes, Nash bargaining solution predicts the choice of one of the
Nash equilibria described above depending on the bargaining power of the players (see Appendix
A.3 for details).
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Figure 5: Possible expected payoffs in the ID and MD games, disagreement outcomes, average
Matched Expected Payoffs (MEP), and Nash Bargaining Solution with bargaining weights 0.6 and
0.4.
To see if the behavior in both games can be explained by a Nash Bargaining Solution with some
fixed bargaining power parameters we take only matched interactions and calculate the Matched
Expected Payoffs (MEP) as we did above separately for each of the 13 independent groups of
participants.16 Blue crosses on Figure 5 show the overall average MEP. In Appendix A.4 we calculate
which NBS bargaining power weights generate the MEPs in each game and find that they correspond
to the principals’ average bargaining weights of 0.593 and 0.610 in the ID and MD games respectively,
a remarkably similar result (standard errors: 0.09 and 0.06). This provides strong evidence that
disagreement outcomes are very important for the choices of the participants. Specifically, the fact
15More specifically the agent can guarantee 70 points by choosing Y ∈ [57.1, 100] in ID and Y ∈ [40, 100] in MD.
16We discard the non-matches because they happen due to noise and miscoordination, whereas NBS assumes that
players can choose to match.
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that principals have much more to lose than agents in case of disagreement leads to the increase of
agents’ bargaining power to 40% as compared to 0% predicted by the non-cooperative (PP)SPE.
Result 4. Accounting for each player’s minimum guaranteed expected payoffs, the Nash Bargaining
Solution with bargaining weights (0.6, 0.4) predicts the average Matched Expected Payoffs in both
ID and MD.
4.4 Principals’ Individual Behavior
In order to understand what causes the behavioral phenomena described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2,
we analyze the determinants of the principals’ success, as defined by their average payoffs in ID and
MD, by looking at the individual choices and reactions to feedback. We start with the analysis that
connects principals’ average choices with their individual characteristics—fairness attitudes and the
perception of rational cutoff points—elicited in Section 3 of the experiment. The regressions in
Table 8 in Appendix C show that principals’ average choices are not determined by their fairness
considerations (variable Dictator choice).17 Their perception of rational cutoff points (variable Cut-
off) only matters slightly in ID, but not in MD (we discuss this in more detail in Section 5). This
result supports our findings from Section 4.2 that principals adjust their choices to those of the
agents due to the threat of not matching.
Section Feedback X ≥ Y Ball Agent’s Principal’s Agent’s
State guess payoff payoff
ID A Yes Blue Blue 0 100
ID B Yes Red Red 100 100
ID C Yes Blue Red 100 0
ID D No Red Blue 0 0
ID E No Blue Blue 0 100
MD B Yes Red Red 100−X 100 +X
MD C Yes Blue Red 100−X X
MD D No Red Blue 0 0
MD E No Blue Blue 0 100
Table 4: Principals’ feedback states in the ID and MD games.
Before we get to the analysis of individual behavior, notice that there is a very strong correlation
between principals’ average Expected Payoffs in ID and MD (Spearman’s ρ = 0.73, p < 0.0001).
Specifically, some principals win a lot in both games and some win very little. Moreover, the
independent groups of participants consist of a mixture of successful and unsuccessful principals
(see Figure 12 in Appendix D). This suggests that success in both games is determined to a large
extent by the individual choices that principals make and not by the groups that they are in, which
allows us to concentrate on the individual choices of principals irrespectively of the group they
belong to.
17The description of all variables use in the regressions can be found in Appendix B.
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To understand the behavioral differences between the successful and the unsuccessful principals
in the two games we divide them into high-earning and low-earning by the median of the sum of
their Expected Payoffs in ID and MD. We consider the reactions of principals to “feedback states”
that distinguish different types of situations that they face after each period. Table 4 shows the
feedback states that depend on 1) whether the pair is matched (X ≥ Y ); 2) the color of the ball
drawn and 3) the agent’s final guess. Notice that the states unambiguously determine the payoffs
of the players, however the opposite is not true: principals and agents can receive the same payoff
in different states. Thus, our analysis includes not only the mechanistic reactions to the realized
payoffs, which are only partially determined by the moves of Nature, but also the reactions to the
outcomes of the principal-agent interaction.
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Figure 6: Principals’ reactions to feedback states. The bars show the sums of coefficients from
the random effects regressions reported in Table 9 in Appendix C. Significance levels *, **, ***
correspond to p < 0.1, 0.05, 0.01.
Figure 6 shows the reactions of principals as estimated by the random effects regressions reported
in Table 9 in Appendix C with changes in X as dependent variables and the dummies for the
feedback states and low-earning principals as independent variables.18 A simple observation from
the graphs is that principals react to a match and a non-match in the expected direction: in both
games they weakly decrease X after a match (states A,B,C) and increase X after a non-match
(states D,E).19 However, the sizes of these reactions are very different for high- and low-earning
principals. Specifically, the more successful principals react to feedback in a much more reserved
way than the less successful ones. This is especially pronounced in ID for the states in which there
was a match (A,B,C). These observations suggest that the less successful principals overreact to
the news that they successfully persuaded their paired agent by dramatically lowering X which
in turn results in a significantly lower chance of matching in the next period. In addition, such
reactions should lead to much more erratic behavior of the low-earning principals as compared to
18The regressions also control for the individual characteristics elicited in Section 3.
19We say “expected direction” in the sense that after a match (when X ≥ Y ) a principal should update her beliefs
of the agents’ actions downwards and thus lower X in an attempt to increase the payoff while still matching in the
next period. Correspondingly, after a non-match (X < Y ) a principal should update her beliefs of the agents’ actions
upwards and thus increase X in order to increase the probability of matching in the next period.
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the high-earning ones. This is indeed the case. Table 5 shows that in ID low-earning principals
have much higher standard deviations of choices X than high-earning principals (ranksum test,
p = 0.0001). In MD this is also true, though the result is weaker (ranksum test, p = 0.0537).
Section Measure Sample Principals
High-earning Low-earning
ID SD of Choices All pairs 16.7 31.2
(2.10) (2.17)
MD SD of Choices All pairs 13.2 19.3
(1.86) (2.41)
N of observations 54 54
Table 5: Mean standard deviations of principals’ choices X. Numbers in brackets indicate standard
errors.
Result 5. Principals who are more stable in their choices and react less to irrelevant circumstantial
feedback earn significantly more than principals who are highly reactive to feedback and thus exhibit
erratic behavior. This is true in both games, but is especially strong in ID.
4.5 Agents’ Individual Behavior
The individual choices of agents clearly have a significant influence on principals’ earnings in both
games. Thus in this section we analyze what drives their choices. As with principals, we first look at
the connection between agents’ average choices and their individual characteristics elicited in Section
3. The regressions in Table 8 in Appendix C show that fairness considerations are a significant
determinant of agents’ average choices in both games (variable Dictator choice). Generous agents
who choose low Y in the Dictator tasks of Section 3 also choose lower average Y in the corresponding
game. The effect is very strong in ID, in size and statistical significance, and somewhat smaller in
size but still significant in MD. This is consistent with our previous findings that agents’ choices
are stable across the two games and are not influenced much by principals’ actions. The rational
cutoff perceptions influence agents’ decisions only weakly in MD (10% significance level), and not
at all in ID (we return to the discussion of cutoff points in Section 5).
Since fairness considerations seem to matter for agents’ choices we consider the individual re-
actions to feedback states separately for “selfish” and “generous” agents, whom we define by the
median split of their answers in the Dictator tasks.20 Table 6 shows selfish and generous agents’ av-
erage choices in the two games. The differences between the two groups in each game are large and
significant (ranksum tests, ID: p = 0.0001; MD: p = 0.0002). In addition to the above mentioned
regressions in Table 8, this supports our conclusion that fairness considerations have a large effect
on agents’ choices.
20We divide agents into selfish and generous separately for ID and MD since we find only weak correlation in ID
and MD generosity within subjects.
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Section Measure Sample Agents
Selfish Generous
ID Choices All pairs 70.6 50.0
(2.43) (3.99)
MD Choices All pairs 66.1 48.5
(2.90) (3.13)
N of observations 54 54
Table 6: Average choices of selfish and generous agents. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 7: Agents’ reactions to feedback states. The bars show the sums of coefficients from the
random effects regressions reported in Table 9 in Appendix C.
Figure 7 shows agents’ reactions depending on the feedback states as estimated by the random
effects regressions reported in Table 9 in Appendix C.21 We observe that agents’ reactions are the
opposite to the principals’ reactions shown in Figure 6. After a match (states A, B, and C) agents
increase Y and after a non-match (states D and E) they weakly decrease Y . This is consistent
with our idea that participants treat the two games as a form of bargaining. The only significant
difference between selfish and generous agents is in state D where there is no match and agents
receive 0 points. Generous agents tend to significantly decrease Y , whereas selfish agents keep it at
the same level. The fact that generous agents prefer lower Y than selfish ones in the Dictator tasks
suggests that this decrease might be due to their fairness considerations. This demonstrates the
mechanism responsible for the lower choices of generous agents as was reported in Table 6 above.
Result 6. Agents’ choices are strongly influenced by their fairness considerations, which in turn
affect the level of principals’ success in both games. Generous agents make an effort to match with
principals by decreasing Y after a non-match, selfish agents do not.
21The regressions also control for the individual characteristics elicited in Section 3 and the lagged choice of the
principals that agents observe on their feedback screens.
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5 Discussion
Despite the parallelism of information and mechanism design discussed in the literature and the
theoretical equivalence of the games in our experiment, we find that the two environments are
perceived very differently, and as a consequence the behavior in ID and MD is not the same and
departs systematically from the theoretical predictions. In this section we discuss possible reasons
why theoretical parallelism fails behaviorally.
ID and MD Entail Different Degrees of Payoff Uncertainty. From the theoretical perspective
a risk neutral decision maker is indifferent between a lottery and its certainty equivalent. In some
sense, this indifference lies at the core of the parallelism between information and mechanism design
suggested in the literature. Nevertheless, the two designs are very different in terms of the payoff
uncertainty experienced by the players. In the ID game players either win the highest possible
payoff or nothing, whereas in the MD game the “deterministic” monetary transfers smooth out
these extreme payoffs thus making the uncertainty created by the moves of Nature much less
pronounced.
This difference between the two designs has major implications for the behavior of the partici-
pants in our experiment. Looking at Figures 6 and 7 it becomes clear that the reactions of principals
and agents to the feedback are much larger in absolute values in ID than in MD, and, as we dis-
cussed above, this has serious ramifications for the earnings of the principals. One possible reason
why the reactions are so different is that in ID participants always receive 0 points or 100 points,
while in MD the payoffs are smoothed by the transfers. Provided that people are reinforcement
learners, it is just natural that they overreact to extreme payoffs. Notice that this has little to do
with possible risk aversion of the participants, but rather with the extreme nature of the payoffs
in ID and the much more continuous payoffs in MD. Thus, while equivalent in expectation, the
extreme nature of payoffs in ID requires a higher degree of expectations-based reasoning and self-
restraint. This constitutes a major practical hurdle for the implementation of information design
and its substitutability with mechanism design.
ID and MD Impose Different Kinds of Contracts. Another stumbling block to the theoretical
parallelism of ID and MD is the difference in the “flavor” of a contract between the principal and the
agent in the two games. The situation in MD is more straightforward and in some sense represents
a more natural agreement: the principal pays money to the agent and in return the agent chooses
an unfavorable option (guesses red). Even if the ball turns out to be blue and the agent does not
earn any money from the guess, she is not particularly disappointed since she is compensated for
exactly this contingency by the principal. This is reflected in Figure 7 where agents’ reactions to
different ball colors in case of a match (right graph, feedback states B and C) are very similar,
even though the realized payoffs differ by 100 points. In ID, however, the situation is very different.
When the agent agrees to follow the principal’s recommendation there is a sense in which the agent
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is “entrusting” the principal with making the guess. Thus, when it happens that the followed
recommendation is bad (the guess is red but the ball is blue) the agent is left with no monetary
compensation; a feeling of regret for not going with the default choice (guess blue); and a feeling
of betrayal since the principal talked her into guessing a wrong color. Thus, there is a large room
for discontent and resentment, which is clearly visible on the left graph of Figure 7 (feedback state
C), which shows that when this happens agents tend to react very strongly by increasing Y in the
next period by around 40 points. In fact, an additional analysis in Appendix E demonstrates that
experiencing C in the ID game has a long-lasting impact on agents’ behavior since their choices
never return back to the pre-state C levels.
Overall, discontinuous payoffs and the necessity to fully trust principals’ recommendations in
information design seem to generate inflated emotion-driven reactions that result in behavior that is
very different from what is happening in mechanism design characterized by continuous payoffs and
pre-agreed compensations for bad outcomes. These differences should be considered by a principal
who is choosing between designing an informational or a monetary contract.
Perception of Monetary and Informational Compensations. The difference in the percep-
tion of the ID and MD games does not end with the effects described above. Our data reveal
that agents are more demanding when being incentivized than when being persuaded. However, if
we take into account agents’ estimates of the rational cutoff points the picture becomes somewhat
different.
Figure 8 shows the average choices of principals and agents in ID and MD as well as their
average estimates of the rational risk neutral cutoffs that are elicited by the Cutoff tasks in Section
3. Consider first the graph for MD. Here we see that both principals’ and agents’ average choices
are close to what they think is the optimal cutoff. Thus, despite the fact that these estimates are
above the theoretical predictions, agents ask for what they believe to be optimal on average. This
is also supported by the regression in Table 8 in Appendix C, which shows that the agents’ average
choices in MD depend significantly, albeit at 10% level, on the expressed cutoff point.
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Figure 8: Average choices, theoretical predictions, and participants’ estimates of rational (risk
neutral) cutoffs.
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In ID, however, the situation is very different. First, participants’ average choices are very far
from what they believe is optimal. Second, even though the average choices are close to the theoret-
ical predictions, the much lower cutoff estimates suggest that this is coincidental. We hypothesize
that, given the high uncertainty related to two independent sources—the moves of Nature and the
probabilistic signals from principals—agents try to be more cautious and increase their choices above
the level that they think is optimal, which also drags principals’ choices along. This idea is not
that far fetched. Indeed, many studies (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Charness et al., 2007;
Holt and Smith, 2009; Abdellaoui et al., 2015) show that people are not very good at maximizing
expected payoffs when there is a need to reason about probabilities or perform Bayesian updating.
This should act as a warning to both policymakers and designers of informational environments.
Receivers of information may not be particularly good at aggregating information and deciding how
much of it is “enough.” What is more, they seem to anticipate their limitations and consequently
behave in a conservative manner in order to hedge against potential mistakes.
Theoretical Implications. Our final note is on the theoretical implications of our behavioral
findings. As we discuss in Section 4.3, the Principal-Preferred Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium concept
of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) does not seem to do a good job at explaining the behavior of
participants since it completely ignores the bargaining power that agents have in both the ID
and the MD games. Of course, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) consider a one-shot interaction,
whereas our participants play many games in a row which allows principals to get an idea about
the agents’ strategy, the threshold value of Y . This is exactly where the bargaining power may
become important. However, as is well known from, for example, Ultimatum bargaining (Gu¨th
et al., 1982), even in one-shot interactions the ability of the second mover to destroy the payoff of
the first has a very tangible effect on the first movers’ choices. Notice as well that this effect should
be more pronounced in the ID and MD games than in the Ultimatum game, since in the latter the
second mover destroys her own payoff along with the first mover’s (and first movers still choose to
accommodate), while in our games the agent guarantees herself a rather high expected payoff of
70 points by not following the recommendation or rejecting the transfer. Thus, the threat to the
principal is much more severe. We think that future models of Information Design should take this
very real effect into account if they strive to explain human behavior in ID and MD environments.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents an experimental analysis of the theoretical parallelism between information
design (ID) and mechanism design (MD) that has been proposed in the literature (see e.g., Berge-
mann and Morris, 2017; Taneva, 2017). We modify the framework of Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011) so that both the ID and MD principal-agent problems can be formulated as games with
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identical action spaces, equivalent best response correspondences, and the same predicted expected
payoffs for each player in the Principal-Preferred Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium [(PP)SPE].
In order to minimize various contextual influences we have designed the ID and MD games in
such a way that both principals and agents choose a single number in very similar and relatively
simple environments. In both games there are two states of the world determined by the color of a
ball drawn from an urn with common knowledge of the ball composition (seven blue balls and three
red balls). An agent receives a reward if she guesses the color of the ball correctly, while a principal
receives a reward if the agent guesses color red. In MD a principal chooses the amount of money
to pay an agent for choosing red. In ID a principal chooses the informativeness of a message sent
to an agent about the color of the ball. The similarity of the two games allows us to make direct
comparisons of benefits of persuasion and incentivization.
We find that the (PP)SPE is a poor predictor of actual choices in both games. One reason is that
agents are much more demanding when the problem is framed as a mechanism design game than
when it is framed as an information design game. Another reason is that in (PP)SPE principals
have a serious first mover’s advantage, which should theoretically allow them to extract all surplus
from the agent, whereas in reality principals are threatened by the possibility of disagreement with
the agent in which case they receive zero payoff, while agents still receive high profits from guessing
blue. To stress the behavioral importance of the disagreement outcomes we analyze the games with
the Nash Bargaining Solution and find that agents possess bargaining power of about 40%, which
explains average payoffs in both games.
Our main result is that ID is more profitable for principals than MD. Specifically, principals in
ID are more often successful at persuading agents to follow their recommendation than to accept
a transfer in MD. Moreover, principals earn significantly more in ID than in MD conditional on
a successful persuasion or incentivization. Additionally, we find that in ID, which admits only
extreme payoffs (win all or lose all), some principals overreact to irrelevant information about the
ball color, which leads to their earning much less than the principals who ignore this information. In
MD this problem does not arise since the payoffs are smoothed by the transfers. Agents also react
differently to similar outcomes in the two games. In ID, when agents follow the recommendation
but fail to guess the correct color, their reaction is much more extreme than in MD when they
agree to a transfer, guess red, but the ball is blue. We hypothesize that this difference comes
from “betrayal aversion” experienced in ID but not in MD. Finally, we find that agents have more
difficulties in understanding how to maximize their payoffs in ID as compared to MD, which results
in more reliance on simple heuristics like “fair” outcomes and noisier choices that give advantage
to principals.
Overall, while theoretical parallels can be easily drawn between the emerging field of infor-
mation design and the more traditional mechanism design, our study shows that in practice this
parallelism faces strong challenges. The main reason is that people perceive informational manip-
ulations differently from monetary ones. Our study singles out some of the behavioral aspects of
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this difference, but further investigations are necessary to fully comprehend the mechanisms that
determine behavior in the two environments.
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Appendix (for online publication)
A Theoretical Derivations
A.1 Equilibrium in the Information Design Extension
For this game we will make use of the Kamenica and Gentzkow’s Principal-Preferred Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium and solve the game through backward induction. We provide the intuition behind the solution,
omitting detailed proofs which are provided in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and other sources.
Stage 2. The agent’s problem is to choose an action c(m) ∈ {r, b} for every possible message m ∈ {ρ, β} to
maximize her expected payoff given the prior probability distribution p over the states and the principal’s
signal structure (PR, PB):
c∗(m) = argmaxc∈{r,b} P (m)Π
A
R,c + (1− P (m))ΠAB,c
where P (m) denotes the posterior probability of state R given the message m, which is generated from
the principal’s signal structure (PR, PB)—chosen by the principal in stage 1—and is calculated according
to the Bayes’ rule as follows:1
P (m) = Pr(R|m) = Pr(m|R) Pr(R)
Pr(m)
=
pPr(m|R)
pPr(m|R) + (1− p) Pr(m|B)
1− P (m) = Pr(B|m) = Pr(m|B) Pr(B)
Pr(m)
=
(1− p) Pr(m|B)
pPr(m|R) + (1− p) Pr(m|B)
Essentially, the agent Bayes-updates her beliefs about the likelihood of each state and then takes the action
which matches the state that is more likely to have been realized under each message:
c∗(m) =
{
r, if P (m) ≥ 1/2.
b, if P (m) < 1/2.
Note that we follow Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) in resolving the indifference case (where P (m) = 1/2)
by having the agent choosing the principal-preferred action r (which is where the “principal-preferred”
part in the equilibrium name comes from).
Stage 1. The principal’s problem is to choose a signal structure (PR, PB) to maximize her expected
payoff, which is the probability with which the agent will choose action r times the payoff derived from
that action, Pr(c∗(m) = r)Π. Given the agent’s optimal behavior derived in Stage 2, this problem reduces
to maximizing Pr[P (m) ≥ 1/2]. The intuition behind the solution goes as follows. Since p < 12 , it is
impossible to have P (m) ≥ 12 for both m ∈ {ρ, β} so the best that the principal can do is to choose
one message for which the induced posterior will be weakly greater than half and for the other message
strictly less than half. Without loss of generality and to facilitate the parallelism of messages as action
recommendations we assume that the principal will choose to induce the posteriors such that P (ρ) ≥ 12 ,
P (β) < 12 . (i.e., such that the agent will want to choose c
∗(ρ) = r, c∗(β) = b). The principal thus seeks
to maximize Pr(m = ρ) (equivalently, maximize Pr(m = ρ|s = R) and minimize Pr(m = β|s = B)) while
being constrained by P (ρ) ≥ 12 , P (β) < 12 . To do so, the principal chooses to always transmit the correct
message (recommendation) in the state where both players’ preferred actions coincide (when s = R) and
mix the recommendations in the state where the players’ preferred actions conflict (when s = B) such that
the following is satisfied:
1PR = Pr(m = ρ|s = R), PB = Pr(m = β|s = B).
1
P (ρ) ≥ 1/2
Pr(m = ρ|s = R) Pr(R)
Pr(r)
≥ 1/2
Pr(m = ρ|s = R)p
Pr(m = ρ|s = R)p+ Pr(m = ρ|s = B)(1− p) ≥ 1/2
p
p+ Pr(m = ρ|s = B)(1− p) ≥ 1/2
Pr(m = ρ|s = B) ≤ p
1− p
⇒ PB = Pr(m = β|s = B) ≥ 1− 2p
1− p .
Since the principal seeks to minimize PB, the solution to the principal’s problem is given by:
P ∗R = Pr(m = ρ|s = R) = 1
P ∗B = Pr(m = β|s = B) =
1− 2p
1− p
Principal-Preferred Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Information Design Game. The principal’s
optimal signal structure derived above induces the following posteriors:
P (m) =
{
1
2 , if m = ρ
0, if m = β.
Correspondingly, the agent’s optimal action-choice rule dictates the following choice rule in equilibrium:
c∗(m) =
{
r, if m = ρ
b, if m = β.
Given the above, each player’s expected payoffs are given by:
EsΠ
P
s,c∗(m) = pPr(m = ρ|s = R)Π + (1− p) Pr(m = ρ|s = B)Π
= 2pΠ
EsΠ
A
s,c∗(m) = pPr(m = ρ|s = R)Π + (1− p) Pr(m = β|s = B)Π
= (1− p)Π
A.2 Equilibrium in the Mechanism Design Extension
For this game, we again use the Principal-Preferred Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (where “Principal-
Preferred” is again used to indicate that we will resolve the indifference case in favor of the principal) as
the solution concept for this game.
Stage 2. The agent’s problem is to choose an action c ∈ {r, b} to maximize her expected payoff given the
prior probability distribution p over the states and the principal’s transfers (tr, tb):
c∗ = argmaxc∈{r,b} pΠ
A
R,c + (1− p)ΠAB,c + tc,
2
where tc denotes the action-contingent transfer that the principal chooses in stage 1. For risk-neutral
expected utility maximizing agent, the optimal action is given by
c∗ =
{
r, if tr − tb ≥ (1− 2p)Π
b, if tr − tb < (1− 2p)Π.
Note that once again here we resolve the indifference case when tr = (1 − 2p)Π + tb by having the agent
choosing action r. Also note that in this case, given the principal’s action-contingent transfers, the agent’s
action is deterministic. This is in contrast to the information design case where the agent’s action-choice
rule is a function of the probabilistically generated message.
Stage 1. The principal’s problem is to choose (non-negative) action-contingent transfers (tr, tb) in order
to maximize her expected payoff, which is given by the payoff in the baseline game minus the transfer
conditional on the agent’s action: ΠPs,c−tc. Trivially, it is optimal to set t∗b = 0 since ΠPs,b = 0,∀s = {R,B}.
The problem then reduces to minimizing tr so that the agent finds it optimal to choose r:
t∗r = argmaxtr∈[0,100] Π− tr
s.t. tr ≥ (1− 2p)Π.
The solution to the principal’s problem is given by
t∗r = (1− 2p)Π
t∗b = 0
Principal-Preferred Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Mechanism Design Game. The principal’s
optimal transfer choice induces the agent to choose r in equilibrium.
c∗ = r
Given this, the player’s expected payoffs are given by:
EsΠ
P
s,r = Π− t∗r = 2pΠ
EsΠ
A
s,r = pΠ + t
∗
r = (1− p)Π
A.3 ID and MD in Normal Form: Nash Equilibria and Bargaining
We find Nash equilibria by explicitly defining the best response correspondences. Principals’ best response
correspondences:
BRPrincipalID (Y ) = Y, ∀ Y ∈ [0, 100]
BRPrincipalMD (Y ) = Y, ∀ Y ∈ [0, 100]
Agents’ best response correspondences:
BRAgentID (X) =

(X, 100], if X < 4007
[0, 100], if X = 4007
[0, X], if X > 4007
3
BRAgentMD (X) =

(X, 100], if X < 40
[0, 100], if X = 40
[0, X], if X > 40
The intersection of the above best response correspondences identifies a continuum of Nash equilibria for
each game as shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Best responses and Nash equilibria for the ID and MD games. “Agent-preferred NE” refers to
the Nash equilibrium that is best for the agent in terms of expected payoffs. Correspondingly “Principal-
preferred NE” refers to the Nash equilibrium that is best for the principal.
The set of Nash equilibria is very similar in the two games, except that the range is slightly larger in
the MD game due to the fact that the (PP)SPE is at a lower point. The Principal-preferred Nash equilibria
should not to be confused with the corresponding Principal-Preferred Subgame Perfect Equilibria, except
that they coincide in both games. This merely reflects the fact that the first-mover advantage of the
principal in the two-stage version of the games, assigns full bargaining power to the principal.
To highlight the equivalence of the NE of the two games, Figure 10 graphs them in the expected-
payoff space. We note the following. Conditional on agreement (X ≥ Y ), no equilibrium outcome Pareto
dominates any other (i.e., the surplus generated by persuasion or incentives does not depend on who
receives it). Moving along the red striped line from left to right, the expected payoffs of the Nash equilibria
increase for the principal and decrease for the agent in a linear fashion. Thus, conditional on agreement,
both the ID and MD games resemble constant-sum games. The equilibrium outcomes predicted by the
(PP)SPE corresponds to the best Nash equilibrium for the principal (Principal-preferred NE). We call
“Disagreement outcome” the minimum guaranteed expected payoff that each player can guarantee in each
game. This happens when the principal chooses X = 100 (guaranteed to persuade/incentivize) and when
the agent chooses Y ≥ 4007 in ID and Y ≥ 40 in MD. We call “Non-match outcome” the expected payoffs for
each player when the principal fails to persuade/incentivize (X < Y ). While the disagreement outcomes
are the same as the non-match outcomes for agents across the two games, it is not the case for principals.
This is because by choosing X = 100, in ID the principal constructs a fully-informative signal structure
which guarantees her 30 points in expectation (since the agent will choose c∗ = r, 30% of the time) while in
MD the principal transfers 100 points (all of her points) to the agent, thus essentially guaranteeing herself
zero points.
Next, we cahracterize the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). For the ID game we solve the following
constrained optimization problem:
max
P,A
(P − 30)α(A− 70)1−α
s.t. P +A = 130,
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Figure 10: Expected payoffs in the ID and MD games. “Disagreement outcome” refers to the minimum
guaranteed expected payoffs for each player. “Non-match outcome” refers to the expected payoffs when
the principal fails to persuade/incentivize the agent (X < Y ).
where P and A represent the principal’s and agent’s NBS agreement payoffs. 30 and 70 represent each
player’s disagreement outcomes while 130 is the total surplus. Finally α denotes the principals relative
bargaining power. Since we, ex ante, take an agnostic view on the bargaining power we note that the above
constrained optimization problem with equal bargaining power, NBS(0.5, 0.5) admits a global maximum
at the point P = 45, A = 85.
Similarly for the MD game, to find NBS we solve the following constrained optimization problem:
max
P,A
(P − 0)α(A− 70)1−α
s.t. P +A = 130,
where the only difference from the NBS in the ID game is that principal’s minimum guaranteed expected
payoff (disagreement outcome) decreases from 30 to 0. The NBS(0.5, 0.5) admits a global maximum at
the point P = 30, A = 100.
Thus, one can see that these two otherwise identical problems in terms of the (PP)SPE can predict a
significant difference in expected payoffs (up to 50% less for the principal in MD than in ID) in terms of
the Nash equilibria with uniform relative bargaining power for the two players. This happens because of
the difference in the minimum guaranteed expected payoff that principals can guarantee themselves in ID
and MD.
A.4 Calculation of the Nash Bargaining Weights in ID and MD
In this section, we backtrack the relative Nash bargaining weights of each player from the observed matched
expected payoffs in the ID game (left) and the MD game (right).
max
P ID,AID
(P ID − 30)αID(AID − 70)1−αID max
PMD,AMD
(PMD − 0)αMD(AMD − 70)1−αMD
s.t. P ID +AID = 130 s.t. PMD +AMD = 130
The P variables denote principal’s expected payoffs and A variables denote agent’s expected payoffs in the
corresponding game. From these constrained maximization problems we obtain the following relationships
between principal’s relative bargaining power α and the agent’s matched average expected payoff in the
5
ID game (left) and MD game (right):
αID =
100−AID
30
αMD =
130−AMD
60
Plugging the agents’ average Matched Expected Payoffs (MEP) obtained from the data (see Section 4.3)
we obtain the average principals’ relative bargaining power in ID (left) and MD (right):
αID = 0.593 ≈ 0.6 αMD = 0.610 ≈ 0.6
Interestingly, we observe that conditional on pairs matching, principals and agents exhibit similar relative
bargaining powers across the two games. Taking this result at face value, it may appear that the difference
in the absolute values of the Matched Expected Payoffs that we observe can be fully attributed to the
difference in the minimum guaranteed outcome that principals can obtain in the two games.
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B Variables Used in the Regressions
Variable Range Definition
Average choice [0, 100] for each participant and each game (ID or MD), the average choice
(X or Y ) made in 10 periods
Dictator choice [0, 100] for each participant and each game (ID or MD), the choice (X if
principal, Y if agent) made in the Dictator tasks in Section 3
Cutoff [0, 100] for each participant and each game (ID or MD), the choice (X if
principal, Y if agent) made in the Cutoff tasks in Section 3
D.X [0, 100] the difference in principal’s choice X in the current and the previous
period
D.Y [0, 100] the difference in agent’s choice Y in the current and the previous
period
Low-earning principal 0/1 is 1 if the average expected payoff of a principal in a game (ID or
MD) is below median of all 54 principals
Generous agent in ID 0/1 is 1 if agent’s cutoff estimate in ID (the Cutoff ID task in Section 3)
is below median of all 54 agents
Generous agent in MD 0/1 is 1 if agent’s cutoff estimate in MD (the Cutoff MD task in Section
3) is below median of all 54 agents
L.B, L.C, L.D, L.E 0/1 is 1 if the feedback state B,C,D,E was observed by a participant in
the previous period
L.X in ID [0, 100] the principal’s choice X in ID observed by an agent in the previous
period
L.X in MD [0, 100] the principal’s choice X in MD observed by an agent in the previous
period
Table 7: Variables used in the regressions.
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C Additional Regressions
Average choice Principals Agents
ID MD ID MD
Dictator choice –0.026 0.073 0.445*** 0.215**
(0.060) (0.117) (0.078) (0.106)
Cutoff 0.186** –0.059 0.036 0.161*
(0.079) (0.043) (0.062) (0.086)
Constant 49.483*** 52.286*** 27.776*** 33.470***
(3.566) (2.237) (8.966) (7.333)
N observations 54 54 54 54
N groups 13 13 13 13
Table 8: Random effects linear regressions of average choices on the Dictator and Cutoff choices in Section
3. Errors are robust and clustered by the 13 independent groups of participants. Standard errors in
parentheses. Significance levels *, **, *** correspond to p < 0.1, 0.05, 0.01.
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D.X, D.Y Principals Agents
ID MD ID MD
Low-earning principal –23.896*** –8.585
(6.842) (7.677)
Generous agent in ID –5.476
(4.606)
Generous agent in MD 5.697
(3.888)
L.B 14.305*** –0.168
(3.210) (7.923)
L.C 17.272*** –0.155 19.449*** 7.963***
(3.713) (2.696) (6.901) (1.937)
L.D 27.005*** 8.624*** –19.214*** –7.346*
(7.379) (2.581) (7.250) (3.920)
L.E 29.086*** 14.414*** –19.083*** –9.773**
(5.615) (2.467) (5.397) (3.946)
L.B × Group 3.683 2.203
(8.380) (8.955)
L.C × Group 10.682 1.094 7.393 –6.972**
(9.272) (7.516) (10.174) (3.492)
L.D × Group 33.073** 15.841* –11.170 –21.582***
(13.560) (8.753) (10.405) (7.437)
L.E × Group 30.477*** 9.606 3.309 –10.073*
(10.125) (9.958) (7.064) (5.789)
Dictator choice –0.036 0.013
(0.031) (0.022)
Cutoff 0.064 –0.011 –0.018 0.054**
(0.050) (0.018) (0.029) (0.023)
L.X in ID –0.145***
(0.055)
L.X in MD –0.179***
(0.044)
Constant –16.873*** –3.964** 19.435*** 11.293**
(3.864) (1.899) (6.145) (4.527)
N observations 486 486 486 486
N groups 54 54 54 54
Table 9: Random effects linear regressions of change in choice (X or Y ) between periods t and t− 1. The
dummy Group stands for Low-earning principal, Generous agent in ID, or Generous agent in MD depending
on the regression. Errors are robust and clustered by participant. Significance levels *, **, *** correspond
to p < 0.1, 0.05, 0.01.
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D Additional Figures
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Figure 11: Histograms of agents’ choices in ID and MD.
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Figure 12: Scatterplot of the principals’ average Expected Payoffs (54 principals). We divide the 13
independent groups of principals into high-earning and low-earning groups by the median split of average
group payoffs. The red dots show principals from the high-earning groups and the blue dots from the
low-earning groups. It is clear that some principals from high-earning groups earn little and vice versa.
Therefore, earnings are not exclusively determined by the group to which a principal belongs, but also
depend on her individual decisions.
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E The Impact of Feedback State C in ID
In the analysis of the reactions of agents to feedback states in Section 4.5 we observed that the largest
reaction in ID was to state C, which happens when agents follow the recommendation, guess red, but
receive 0 points because the ball is blue. As we discuss in Section 5 this reaction is the main difference
between ID and MD since in MD agents are paid for guessing red, which does not create the “betrayal”
problem evident in ID. We hypothesize that agents blame principals for “tricking” them into following the
recommendation.
The figure above shows the average increase in choices of agents after experiencing feedback state C for
the first time. For each agent we take the difference between the consecutive choices and the choice that
was made when state C happened. We observe that agents are influenced by state C so much that they
do not decrease their choices even 7 periods after the occurrence of state C, indicating that experiencing
this state does not only cause extreme but also long-lasting reaction.
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F Instructions
All instructions below were translated to Italian since the experiment was run in Trento, Italy. For the
Italian version, please contact the authors.
F.1 Instructions for the ID Section
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F.2 Instructions for the MD Section
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G Screenshots
G.1 ID Section
Figure 13: Choice screens of Player As - principals (“Giocatore A”) and Player Bs - agents (“Gio-
catore B”) in each period in the ID section.
Figure 14: Feedback screens of Player As - principals (Left) and Player Bs - agents (Right) in each
period in the ID section.
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G.2 MD Section
Figure 15: Choice screens of Player As - principals (“Giocatore A”) and Player Bs - agents (“Gio-
catore B”) in each period in the MD section.
Figure 16: Feedback screens of Player As - principals (Left) and Player Bs - agents (Right) in each
period in the MD section.
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